text of el baradei\'s feb. 14 report
Security Council Friday on Iraq\'s nuclear inspection: my report to the Council today is an update on the agency\'s nuclear verification activities in Iraq in accordance with Security Council resolution 1441 and other relevant resolutions.
It has been less than three weeks since I last updated the Council on January. 27 —
The time is relatively short throughout the inspection process.
I believe, however, that the Council must continue to be actively involved and fully informed at this critical juncture.
The focus of the IAEA inspection has now shifted from the \"reconnaissance phase\" to the \"investigation phase \".
The goal of the \"reconnaissance phase\" is to re-
Quickly build our knowledge base on Iraq\'s nuclear capabilities to ensure that nuclear activities at known critical facilities are not restored and to verify the location of nuclear materials and related non-nuclear facilities
Nuclear materials and equipment, and identification of the current workplace for former key Iraqi personnel.
The \"investigation phase\" focuses on understanding Iraq\'s activities over the past four years, particularly in areas identified by states as of concern and those identified by the IAEA on the basis of its own analysis. Since our Jan.
27. It was reported that the agency carried out 38 additional inspections at 19 locations and a total of 177 inspections at 125 locations.
Iraq continued its immediate access to all locations.
During the inspection, we have identified certain facilities and we will re-
Establishment of containment and surveillance systems for continuous monitoring of activities related to key dual controlsuse equipment.
At this point, we are using regular checks to ensure that the device is not used for prohibited purposes.
Hot news center strip climate change documentary Trump derogatory Twitter David Ortiz was discharged from Moscow protest as I mentioned in my last report to the Council, we have some extensive
Area and location
Specific measures to detect past or ongoing signs of undeclared nuclear activity in Iraq, including environmental sampling and radiation detection investigations.
In this regard, we have been collecting a wide variety of samples at the inspected facilities and other locations throughout Iraq, including water, sediment and vegetation, and analyzing them to obtain nuclear activity
We have also resumed air sampling at key locations in Iraq.
Three of the four air mining prototypes demolished in December 2002 for renovation have returned to Iraq.
One of them is installed in a fixed position and the other two are installed on the mobile platform.
In order to make better use of this technology, we intend to increase the number of them.
We are also continuing to expand the use of our hands. held and car-
Gamma measurements in Iraq
On the way to the inside of the inspection site and location as well as to the city and industrial zone, Gamma measuring vehicles were used.
We will start the helicopter.
As soon as the relevant equipment is finally certified for the helicopter model provided to US for use in Iraq, gamma ray measurements will be performed.
The agency continued to interview key Iraqi personnel.
We were able to do four interviews in private recently.
That is, in the absence of an Iraqi observer.
However, respondents have recorded their interviews on tape.
In addition, discussions continued with Iraqi technicians and officials as part of inspection activities and technical meetings.
I should note that at our recent meeting in Baghdad, Iraq reconfirmed its commitment to encourage its citizens to receive private interviews both inside and outside Iraq.
At the request of the IAEA, Iraq has expanded the list of Iraqi personnel concerned and its current place of work to more than 300.
Included in the list.
Level scientists in nuclear and nuclear-related fields known to the IAEA.
However, we will continue to ask for information on personnel at a lower level in Iraq whose work may be of great significance to our mandate.
I would now like to provide an update on some of the specific issues that we are currently dealing.
I should mention that shortly before our recent meeting in Baghdad, based on our discussions with our Iraqi counterparts, Iraq provided documents relating to these issues: it is reported that attempts to import uranium, the procurement of aluminum tubes, the procurement of magnets and magnet production capacity, the use of HMX, these issues and concerns remain outstanding in 1998.
I will talk briefly about these issues.
Iraq continues to say it has not tried to import uranium since the 1980 s.
The agency has recently received a number of additional information relating to this issue, and it is hoped that, with the assistance of the reported participating African countries, such information will be further explored.
The agency continues to follow up on Iraq\'s recognized efforts to import high-strength aluminum tubes.
As you know, Iraq has announced that these efforts are related to a project to reverse engineer conventional rockets.
The International Atomic Energy Agency has confirmed that Iraq is indeed building such rockets.
However, we are still exploring whether these pipelines are intended to manufacture centrifuges for uranium enrichment.
In this investigation, Iraq was asked to explain the reasons for the strict tolerance specifications it required to suppliers.
Iraq provided documents related to reverse engineering projects and promised to provide test tube samples received from potential suppliers.
We will continue to look into this matter further.
In response to the agency\'s inquiry about Iraq\'s attempts to procure magnet manufacturing facilities and possible links to the restoration of its nuclear programme, Iraq has recently provided additional documentation that we are currently working on.
During the inspection process related to the aluminum tube investigation, IAEA inspectors found some documents related to the transaction aimed at purchasing carbon fiber
Use materials used in Iraq\'s past secret uranium enrichment program to manufacture gas centrifuge rotors.
Our review of these documents indicates that the carbon fiber sought by Iraq is not for enrichment purposes, as the specification of the material appears to be inconsistent with the specification required to manufacture the rotor tube.
In addition, we have done the following:
During the inspection, we were able to observe this carbon fiber in the non-nuclear-
Relevant applications and samples.
However, the agency will continue to address this issue.
The agency continues to investigate the transfer and consumption of high-explosive HMX.
As I reported earlier, Iraq announced that the previous 32 tons of HMX under IAEA seal had been transferred for the production of industrial explosives, mainly for cement plants as boosters for explosives used for quarrying.
Iraq provided us with more information, including documents on the movement and use of such materials, and carried out inspections at locations where such materials were said to be used.
However, given the nature of the use of high explosives, it is likely that the agency will not be able to reach a final conclusion on the final use of such materials.
While we have no indication that this material is used for any application other than that announced by Iraq, we do not have a technical method to quantitatively verify the use of the material announced in the explosion.
We will continue to focus on this issue, review Iraq\'s civilian mining practices and interview key Iraqi personnel involved in previous relevant R & D activities.
We have completed a more detailed review of the 2000-page document found in a private residence of an Iraqi scientist in January 16.
These documents mainly involve laser, including enriched uranium using laser technology.
Composed of technical reports;
Minutes of the meeting (
Including the standing committee on laser applications); personal notes;
Copies of publications and student research projects;
And some administrative documents, some of which are marked as confidential.
While these documents provide more details of the laser enrichment development efforts in Iraq, they refer to activities or locations already known to the IAEA and appear to be personal profiles of scientists found.
There is nothing in the document that changes the conclusion that the IAEA had previously reached on the scope of the Iraq laser enrichment program.
However, we continue to stress to Iraq that it should seek and provide all documents that may be relevant to our mandate, whether personal or otherwise.
Last week, Iraq also provided the IAEA with documents on issues and concerns that need further clarification since 1998, particularly on weapons and centrifuge design.
However, no new information is included in this document.
It is hoped that the new Iraqi commission set up by Iraq to find any additional documents and hardware related to its weapons of mass destruction plan will be able to find documents and other evidence that can assist in clarifying these remaining issues and concerns, and other areas of current concern.
Finally, the director of the Iraqi national monitoring bureau told me this morning that national legislation prohibiting prohibited activities had been passed today.
This long-standing resolution
I believe that the long term legal issue is a step in the right direction, and Iraq will demonstrate its commitment to fulfilling its obligations under Security Council resolutions.
In the coming weeks, the agency will continue to expand its inspection capacity in a number of ways, including the widespread use of unannounced inspections at all relevant locations in Iraq.
To strengthen and accelerate our capacity to investigate relevant issues and to restore and strengthen our continuous monitoring and verification system, which ceased in 1998, we intend to increase the number of inspectors and support personnel.
We will also add more analysts and translators to support the analysis of documents and other inspection results.
We intend to increase the number of customs and procurement experts monitoring imports from Iraq.
We will also strengthen and expand the scope of technical meetings and private interviews with Iraqi personnel, based on our preferred approach and location within and outside Iraq.
In addition, we intend to expand our capabilities for the nearreal-
Dual time monitoring
Use of equipment and related activities and implement several additional components of wide-area environmental monitoring with the aim of identifying fingerprints left by nuclear material and nuclear-related activities.
We hope to continue to receive information from countries on possible actions related to our mandate.
Since Iraq has accepted the use of all air surveillance platforms proposed by states to the Commission and the IAEA, including U2 S, Mirage IVs, Antonov and self-driving we plan to use them to support our inspection activities, especially to monitor movement within and around the location to be inspected.
The government of Iraq reiterated last week its commitment to fulfilling its Security Council obligations and to provide full and active cooperation with the inspection organization.
If Iraq fulfills this commitment, the above measures will help to check the effectiveness of the process.
As I have reported many times, the agency concluded by December 1998 that it had invalidated Iraq\'s past nuclear programme and, therefore, there were no outstanding disarmament issues at that time.
Therefore, since the resumption of inspections of Iraq two and a half months ago, our focus has been to verify whether Iraq has resumed its nuclear program in the past few years.
To date, we have found no evidence that Iraq is carrying out prohibited nuclear or nuclear-related activities.
However, as I have just pointed out, some issues are still under investigation and we cannot yet conclude on that, although we have made progress on some of them.
To that end, we intend to make full use of the powers given to us by all relevant Security Council resolutions to build as much capacity as possible for the inspection process, if necessary.
In this regard, I would like to emphasize the importance of the information that states may be able to provide to help us assess the accuracy and completeness of the information provided by Iraq.
The agency\'s experience in nuclear verification has shown that this is possible, particularly with respect to invasive verification systems, to assess whether a state has a nuclear weapons program, even if it has not been fully cooperated by the inspected state.
However, Iraq\'s prompt, full and active cooperation, as requested by resolution 1,441st, will accelerate this process.
More importantly, given Iraq\'s past secret weapons of mass destruction programmes and past models of cooperation, this will enable us to meet the high level of security council assurances needed on the Iraq issue.
I hope that the commitments made recently in Baghdad will continue to translate into concrete and sustained action. Thank you.