During a march to Baghdad on April 8S. The Marines rushed past a row of eucalyptus trees on the edge of Iraq\'s nuclear dream. A 60-acre warehouse behind the tree line, sealed by the United Nations at Ash Shaykhili, holds machine tools, consoles and instruments for nuclear weapons projects cut off by the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Thirty miles north and west, the army is rolling in the area of the Nasar army munitions factory. There are thousands of high cabinets stacked in rectangular wooden boxes. Aluminum pipe strength. These devices, as well as Iraq\'s efforts to buy more equipment overseas, are at the heart of the Bush administration\'s allegations that President Saddam Hussein is back in office for a long time. Efforts to manufacture nuclear weapons have stalled. On that day, the main combat forces had more urgent priorities, but they were not the only ones that passed through storage. The subsequent pursuit of illegal weapons participants said that a few months later, President Bush did not visit Nasr and many other venues of activity known as \"the danger of serious and gathering \". \"According to the records provided by The Washington Post and interviews with weapons investigators from the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia, it does not require a full investigation, it can be found that the central claim of the Bush administration\'s pre-war nuclear case is not substantive or untrue. Investigators say that although Hussain did not abandon his nuclear ambitions or technical records, it is now clear that he did not have a positive plan to manufacture weapons, produce its key materials or acquire the technology he needed. In the close internal judgement of the Iraq investigation team supervised by David Kay as CIA Director George J. Tenet, nuclear weapons scientists in Iraq have not carried out major weapons tests. Relevant work after 1991 indicates that the facilities for suspicious new buildings are benign, and the potential use equipment for nuclear projects is still in a sealed state or for civilian industrial use. Most notably, according to Brig, Australia, investigators believe aluminum tubes are \"harmless \". Gen. Stephen D. Mijin, who commanded the joint captured enemy material development center, half the largest- More than a dozen units reported to Kai The finding is crucial because the Bush administration\'s rationale is that Iraq intends to use these tubes as centrifuge rotors to enrich uranium for the core of nuclear warheads. Government officials interviewed for the report defended the integrity of the government\'s pre-war intelligence and public statements. No one agreed to an interview with the record. In a television interview last month, Vice President Cheney referred to the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate, among which, among other things, said \"there is compelling evidence that Saddam is rebuilding his uranium enrichment efforts. Cheney said investigators will find the sentences valid when looking for confirmation of the sentences. \"His office did not answer any questions on Friday. There is no evidence that is more important than Iraq\'s attempt to buy aluminum tubes overseas. US Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and many others scoffed at the interpretation of the Baghdad government, saying it used the tubes as shells. By August, news reports made it clear that the United StatesS. The government\'s top nuclear centrifuge experts strongly oppose the claim that the pipeline is used for uranium enrichment. Meekin\'s comments, backed by other investigators who expressed concern about the consequences of being named, were the first to describe the results of the post-war analysis. \"They are rockets,\" said Mikin, 48, director-general of the Australian Defense intelligence organization\'s science and technology assessment, over a satellite phone call in Baghdad. \"These tubes are used for rockets. \"A U. S. Government officials, who declined to be named or the agency, said Meekin was not qualified to make the judgment. The official did not elaborate. Kay said in his interim report this month that the issue is still pending. Participants in the Pentagon Since late last spring, the targeted special weapons team, interviewed many times, noted that Kay\'s actions did not take any steps to collect the estimated 20,000 tubes in Iraq\'s inventory- Some serious corrosion, but others of higher quality than the U. S. Three years ago, the government intercepted this dangerous technology in Jordan. \"If you tell me that they have access to these tubes and choose not to catch and destroy them, this destroys the judgment that these tubes can be used for centrifuge development, if not for centrifuge development, robert garucci, dean of Georgetown University\'s School of Foreign Affairs, said he kept his confidential permission and still consulted with government analysts on Iraq. Meekin said he no longer knew the whereabouts of the tubes that had been stacked in Nasr. \"They are not our top priority,\" he said . \" \"Things are harmless. \"Unattended, tube\" may be scattered around the arm plants, caught by the robbers, perhaps in the scrap metal yard. The pickers are likely to sell them as drain pipes, he said. \"When the Marine Corps and Army mechanized forces passed through Iraq\'s nuclear history, three of the most important nuclear weapons scientists in Baghdad met three different fates. Mahdi Obedi, former 1991 enriched uranium centrifuge program, sitting anxiously at home waiting for the United StatesS. investigators. Jaffar Dhai Jaffar, who guided alternative enrichment efforts and other component designs in the name of Petrochemical Three, watched the United StatesS. - He led the coalition forces to invade the UAE, which he had evacuated before the battle began. Khalid Ibrahim, Iraq\'s chief overseer of nuclear warhead design, said he accidentally drove a new United StatesS. checkpoint. He was killed by a fire from the Marine Corps. A short, aggressive man, unpopular among Iraqi contemporaries, said he was less willing than the other two in his dealings with the United StatesN. Inspectors from 1991 to 1998. His loss hit the United States. S. The occupying authorities, because he had unanswered questions in the part of the 1991 \"crash plan\" that made the bomb. It is believed that Saeed kept a comprehensive record of his work on the CD, including design details and assembly drawings. Iraq provided most of the information to the inspectors in electronic form, which was in 7- Quantity report for December. 2002, entitled \"The current declaration of the past nuclear programme in an accurate, complete and complete manner \". \"A copy of this report has been provided to The Washington Post and it is not considered to include all the technical details that Iraq has. Kai said this month that Iraq has taken \"measures to retain some technical capabilities from the start of the war in Iraq \". 1991 nuclear weapons programme. \"If this is true, it will represent a violation of the United States. N. The resolution of the Security Council is far from resuming illegal development. \"Everyone, including Donald Lombard, agreed that the project had been destroyed 12 years ago . \"S. Experts with long experience in Iraq. Question of David [Kay] Whether to restart. \"Jafar, still under the protection of the UAE government, agreed to conduct voluntary interviews with the United States. S. And British investigators. Those familiar with his remarks said he was aggressive and told the Americans- Like he did in America. N. inspections -- There is no hidden nuclear weapons program. He said Iraq has never resumed this effort after the U. S. Withdrawal. S. During the Gulf War, the bomb destroyed the Tuwaitha reactor and the IAEA dismantled the enrichment and design facilities in the next five years. Rose Garden is a former project of Obedi. - Centrifuge for enriched uranium-- The views that the Bush administration has upheld have been revived. According to two close colleagues, Obedi has heard a public statement that he is increasingly anxious to wait for the arriving troops to knock at the door. Anxiety becomes confused when they do not. Two weeks later, the Iraqi scientist turned to a source that was unlikely to get help:S. During Albright\'s tenure as an IAEA consultant, nuclear experts and friendly opponents. According to the Americans, the first thing Obeidi told Albright was that he carefully read Albright\'s work in the medium term. 1990 to find out which of Iraq\'s cover stories is valid. In May 1, Albright began looking for someone at the Department of Defense or the US Department of Defense. S. The central command that would talk to Obeidi, \"but I was rejected. Six days later, he got in touch with the CIA. Auberdi has important information and he would like to clarify it, Albret said. The first meeting with the CIA in May 17 was not progressing well. Obedi wants asylum in the United States. According to the interview with Albright and the same period notes he provided in July, the interviewer is not clear and seems to know very little about the Obeidi or centrifuge project. In June 2, Obedi led investigators to his Rose Garden. There they dug up a cache he buried 12 years ago and saved it from the USN. Inspector: approximately 200 blueprints for gas centrifuge components, 180 documents describing their use and samples of some sensitive components. The parts are far from having a full centrifuge and are not like the thousands required for a series of rotating units to enrich uranium, but the materials show what almost all external experts think --- Iraq retains its nuclear knowledge base. The next day, AmericaS. Special forces stormed Obeidi\'s home and arrested him. - The CIA later explained that this was a misconception. On June 17, shortly after Obedi\'s release, the CIA released his identity and described the rose garden cache as evidence of Iraq\'s secret nuclear program alleged by the Bush administration. However, according to sources familiar with Obeidi\'s detailed description, this is not exactly what he told the interviewer. Obeidi is expected to talk to its American counterparts, according to close partnersS. Centrifugal physicist They said he was frustrated by the lack of these documents by his main interrogators. The man is Joe. Joe is an engineer with expertise in export control, and his reputation at CIA is the most powerful supporter of Iraq\'s controversial aluminum tube as part of the revival centrifuge project. To protect his security, the CIA requested that Joe\'s surname not be disclosed. In his interview, Obedi did not tell Joe what he wanted to hear, United States. S. Government officials said. On the contrary, Obeidi confirmed Iraq\'s nuclear disclosure of accounts listed in volume 7 in December, which states that the previous seven sites of the project \"have no nuclear activities\" since 1991 \", other locations are only \"medical, agricultural and industrial\" activities. The centrifuge project died in 1991 but never recovered, Obeidi said. He buried the documents and prepared to take back orders he had never received. He said he had nothing to do with the aluminum tube and that the centrifuge procedure was of no use to the aluminum tube. Obeidi\'s description is very consistent with the history of enrichment in volume 3 of Iraq\'s official history. The project started in 1988 with the name Al Furat or FOMC and was designed based on the maraging steel rotor. In the second year, Obeidi added an alternative design using a more sophisticated carbon fiber rotor. In July 1990, for the first time, a prototype system successfully separated the isotopes required for uranium from the six fluorine uranium gas. If Iraq does resume its enrichment program, it will need a fluorine plant to convert uranium ore into gas forms and complex magnet systems, connecting bearings and pipes with thousands of rotors in the cascade. Allied officials say investigators at Kay did not find these things. The physical properties of the centrifuge do not allow the simple replacement of the maraging steel and carbon fiber design used by Obeidi with aluminum tubes. The pipe diameter in the Obeidi design is also 145mm; Aluminum Tube Measurement 81mm. According to US media reports, Joe sent a press release to Washington this summer accusing Obedi of hiding the truth. S. An officer who reads an article The Iraqi scientist, who was named in public and worried about his safety, moved to Kuwait\'s CIA security house with his family. He has been in trouble for months. Speaking to Joe and other CIA analysts in an interview on July, Albright said: \"They are just conflicts of interest . \". Their boss is [still] Said the tube was for the centrifuge. \"By the end of the summer, in unknown circumstances, Obedi was given permission to bring his family to the suburbs of the East Coast of the United States. He declined to be interviewed through a middleman, and a government official asked for his position not to be published. Looking to hire Albright of Obedi in Washington- Those based at the Institute for Science and International Security are no longer willing to discuss the case. The book of this month, at the former palace complex in Abu Ghurab, by Baghdad\'s standards, has two small artificial lakes, lush to the end of spring, frustrated members of the nuclear search team began calling themselves \"The Book of the club this month \". \"There are a lot of people reading more novels than they do for the rest of their lives,\" said an investigator who recently returned, anonymous. \"You have some boring people over there. It\'s a lot of time. \"Nuclear investigators have raised expectations for Bush and Cheney, who verbally highlighted Iraq\'s nuclear threat in the most convincing war argument. In the fall of 2002, the president and his advisers referred at least four times to the ghost of the \"mushroom cloud\", some of whom included Defense Secretary Donald H. Rensfi described Iraq\'s nuclear ambitions as a threat to American soil. An investigator said that on the ground in Iraq, the nuclear investigation began with \"the least important task. \"The nuclear team\'s resources, personnel and speed of action are insignificant compared to chemical and biological weapons detectors,\" he said \". Fewer than one- Out of 1% of the search staff, there are a tenth of the nuclear missions, and at the peak of the Iraqi investigation team, there are about a dozen out of 1,500. During the post-war period, investigators had about 600 leads in the \"Integrated Master Site List\", of which the United StatesS. The Central Command identified the \"19 weapons of mass destruction\" of weapons of mass destruction \". Only three of them are nuclear weapons. Relevant information: Ash Shaykhili nuclear facility, Baghdad new nuclear design center and Tahadi nuclear facility. \"We really don\'t need it in our field of expertise,\" the Navy Cmdr. David Beckett said in a recent interview. In Iraq, Beckett directed a group of nuclear weapons. Trained special forces known as the direct support team. Now, Beckett, program manager for the special nuclear program of the Defense Threat Reduction Bureau, said that the aluminum tubes and machine tools cited in the national intelligence estimates for October 2002- Vacuum tubes, industrial magnets and balancing machines- His work in Iraq is \"not a priority \". He added, \"To be honest, I have read more about this since I came back. A government official who defended the CIA\'s pre-war analysis said the message was widely misunderstood. The term \"reconstruction\" refers to the return to the previous state, and the process is often inferred to be short-term, \"he said . \". However, according to the report, Saddam clearly believes that this is a long-termterm process. So did the NIE. Australian general Mikin, who is in charge of collecting Iraqi military technology, said his 500 The member units are dissolved and the work is basically completed. According to U. S. Some of Kayi\'s leading nuclear investigators have left Iraq. Nuclear physicist William domuk, who runs the centrifuge investigation, returned last month to the intelligence station at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory of the Department of Energy. Domke\'s fellow at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Jeffrey Badel, also returned home. The people who understood their work said that Domke and Bedell confirmed their pre-war analysis that the tubes were not suitable for the centrifuge and that there was no procedure in Iraq to use them that way. They saw the tubes in Iraq in December and January for the agency\'s interim mission. They are also the main authors of the Department of Energy\'s disagreement with the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate. Neither of them responded to the messages left by voicemail and emailmail. Steve wappell, spokesman for Livermore, said, \"they really don\'t talk about their work. \" A U. S. Government officials spoke on behalf of the government, but declined to be named, denying that the two physicists had reached the final conclusion. \"Domke may be back soon,\" the official said . \". \"Their work has not been completed. Tim McCarthy, an experienced AmericanN. Inspectors who returned to Iraq late last month to join Kai\'s team said in an interview before leaving that Western analysts had known the 81mm-tube-based Iraqi rocket project \"as early as 1996. Inspectors give attention to these tubes \"probably three minutes out of 100 hours,\" McCarthy said, because they don\'t seem to matter. Mikin said the Nasr 81 rocket \"appeared at an open Ordnance show in 1999\" and that Iraqi army munitions were shown for sale at the meeting. According to US regulations, such sales are illegal. N. Security Council sanctions, but not secrets. Trade magazine reported the show, Mikin said. Part of the reason is that Americans The Led search team did not visit Nasr until July. Iraqi Brig. Gen. Shehab Haythem showed them around and the tubes were neatly arranged. Investigators sent samples to the Sandia National Laboratory in New Mexico, leaving the rest. Ash Shaykhili is a hulk today. In addition to dismantling the remnants of the 1991 plan, it contains exactly the kind of equipment cited by the CIA as part of its compelling rationale for the nuclear threat to Iraq: \"magnet, high Speed Balancing machine and machine tool. Joseph Cirincione, director of the non-proliferation program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said: \"They are not acting as if they take their analysis seriously . \". \"If they are so worried about these tubes, it will be the sensitive equipment that you think the government will want to catch to prevent it from going elsewhere --- Iran, Syria, Egypt. Mikin said that the survey to date shows that Iraq\'s efforts to acquire dangerous technologies have achieved modest success at best since 1991. \"In general, our judgment is that sanctions are very good, or sanctions efforts, to prevent imports of parts and components,\" he said . \". In the field of nuclear proliferation, \"I think North Korea or Iran have more fertile land,\" he said.